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Abstract
Pricing behavior of ￿rms in di⁄erentiated product markets has been studied
intensely in recent empirical work. Despite several accounts in various indus-
tries, price leadership has remained mostly unassessed. This study analyzes
price competition in the U.S. brewing industry with a focus on price leadership
by the largest U.S. beer producer Anheuser-Busch and its heavily marketed
￿King of Beers￿brand Budweiser. This paper employs a unique nationwide
data set on brand-level sales collected before and after a 100% increase in the
federal excise tax on beer. Brand-level demand estimates are combined with
several supply models, including several price leadership scenarios, to simulate
prices that would have prevailed under each model after the tax increase. These
￿predicted￿prices are then compared to ￿actual￿prices after the tax increase
to determine the ￿t of the di⁄erent supply models. While Bertrand-Nash be-
havior appears to be a more suitable model of price competition, it tends to
under-predict price increases of more price-elastic brands and to over-predict
price increases of less price-elastic brands. In particular, the predicted price of
Budweiser is much larger than its actual value. An interpretation of this result
is that Anheuser-Busch could exert more market power through its ￿ agship
brand than it actually does. Overall, actual price movements as a result of the
tax increase tend to be more similar across brands than predicted by any of
the models considered. While this pattern is not inconsistent with leadership
behavior, leadership models considered in this paper do not conform with this
pattern.
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for his collaboration in related work. I would also like to thank Ronald Cotterill, Director of
the Food Marketing Policy Research Center at the University of Connecticut for making the data
available. Research and travel grants from the Department of Economics at Virginia Tech are
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1￿A price increase is needed, but it will take Anheuser-Busch to do it￿
-Robert Uihlein, Chairman of the Schlitz Brewery, Fortune (November,
1975: 92).
￿I think the industry is stupid...If they only had price leadership...which
they don￿ t have...that isn￿ t violative of anything￿
-Allan T. Demaree, legal counsel for the Plumbing Fixture Manufactur-
ers Association, after learning that members had been illegally colluding.
Fortune (December, 1969: 97-98).
1 Introduction
In real life, markets with di⁄erentiated products are the rule rather than the ex-
ception. A large part of the empirical work on these markets has focused on the
pricing behavior of ￿rms. While this element of di⁄erentiated product markets is an
important input for addressing issues such as merger simulation, market power and
new product introductions, for the most part these studies have focused on static
Bertrand-Nash and collusive models of pricing behavior.
Historical accounts of the existence of a leading brand or ￿rm whose pricing de-
cisions are closely followed by competitors have been reported in well scrutinized
industries: the cigarette industry in the 1920￿ s and 1930￿ s, the U.S. automobile in-
dustry in the 1950￿ s, the breakfast cereals industry between the 1960￿ s and 1970￿ s,
and the U.S. brewing industry since the 1970￿ s1. However, formal empirical assess-
ments of this behavior in di⁄erentiated products have been limited.2 Furthermore,
the importance of price leadership goes beyond these frequent informal encounters.
Price leadership not only allows ￿rms to earn larger pro￿ts than competitive pricing,
but, as shown by Rotemberg and Saloner, it may also be used as a collusive device
(￿collusive price leadership￿ ) that could cause higher welfare losses than overt collu-
sion. Despite its potential anti-competitive features, price leadership is not clearly
addressed by antitrust law (Scherer and Ross: 248).
Anheuser-Busch, the U.S. leading beer producer has a 50% market share and has
been identi￿ed as a price leader especially through its heavily marketed ￿King of
Beers￿ brand Budweiser (Greer; Tremblay and Tremblay; and references therein).
For example, in 1954, after an increase in costs due to a new union wage agreement,
1See Scherer and Ross for accounts in the ￿rst three industries and Tremblay and Tremblay for
accounts in the U.S. brewing industry
2Two exceptions are Kadiyali, Vilcassim and Chintagunta, and Gasmi, La⁄ont and Vuong. These
studies, however, have been limited to a small number of di⁄erentiated products (4 and 2, respec-
tively).
2Anheuser-Busch raised the price of Budweiser. After some regional brewers in St.
Louis did not follow suit, Anheuser-Busch decided to aggressively reduce the price
of Budweiser in this region, which elevated its market share from 12.5% to 39.3%. A
few months later, Anheuser-Busch increased the price of Budweiser and this time the
regional brewers learned their costly lesson and followed. Some evidence supports the
fact that by the 1990￿ s Anheuser-Busch, assisted by this successful punishing strategy,
had become the clear price leader (Tremblay and Tremblay: 171; Greer: 49-51).
This paper makes use of a unique scanner data set to empirically assess di⁄erent
models of price competition in the U.S. brewing industry. Two types of leadership
models are considered. The ￿rst is a "collusive price leadership" model in which
followers match Budweiser￿ s price changes. The second is a Stackelberg model. In
one variant of the Stackelberg model Budweiser acts as the price leader while in
the other Anheuser-Busch leads with all its brands. These leadership models are
compared to alternative hypothesis of Bertrand-Nash and collusion.
Frequently, the task of assessing di⁄erent models of ￿rm behavior involves con-
structing often complex non-nested econometric tests of the competing hypotheses.
Alternatively, an exogenous variation in the data or ￿natural experiment￿ can be
exploited to evaluate various models of pricing behavior; this paper utilizes the 1991
100% increase of the federal excise tax on beer.3 This change in policy caused all
beer producers and importers to simultaneously adjust their prices to the new per
unit tax. The dataset is comprised of brand-level prices and quantities collected by
scanning devices in the main U.S. metropolitan areas over a period of 20 quarters
that span before and after the tax introduction (1988-1992). After controlling for
other factors, model assessment is carried out by comparing how well the alternative
models of ￿rm behavior predict observed prices after the tax change.
To perform the assessment of pricing behavior, a structural demand system for 64
brands of beer in 58 major metropolitan areas of the United States is ￿rst estimated.
Unlike most previous work on demand for di⁄erentiated products, the demand model
is based on the neoclassical ￿representative consumer￿approach rather than on a
￿discrete choice￿approach. While for some products such as automobiles the dis-
crete choice assumption maybe plausible, for others it appears less likely. The major
challenge of estimating numerous substitution coe¢ cients is dealt with the Distance
Metric (DM) method devised by Pinkse, Slade and Brett. This study adds to previous
applications of the DM method (Pinkse and Slade; Slade 2004) by applying a demand
system that is more ￿ exible and by estimating advertising substitution patterns.
In a second stage, the estimated demand parameters are used to compute the
implied marginal costs for the di⁄erent models of pricing behavior. Then, the exoge-
nous increase in the federal excise tax from $9 to $18 per barrel levied on all brewers,
together with the estimated marginal costs, are used to compute price increases for
all brands that would have prevailed under each model of pricing behavior. These
3Hausman and Leonard use a similar strategy in which the introduction of a new brand is
exploited to evaluate di⁄erent models of competition.
3predicted price changes are compared to direct estimates of the actual price changes
to assess the predictive power of each model.
2 The Industry and the Excise Tax Increase
Commercial brewing began during the American colonial period. By 1810 there were
132 breweries producing 185,000 barrels of mainly English-type (ale, porter and stout)
malt beverages. Lager beer was introduced in the mid nineteenth century and today
it accounts for over 90 percent of the U.S. brewing industry￿ s output.4 Overall, total
demand for beer in the U.S. has been constantly increasing since the mid twentieth
century. While strong consumption growth patterns were registered between 1960 and
1980, for the last three decades total demand for beer has remained rather steady
(between 180 and 210 million barrels per year). Per capita consumption has had more
of a ￿ uctuating pattern but has stagnated as well at approximately at 22 gallons.
Many features of the U.S. brewing industry have interested researchers for decades.
Arguably, the dramatic change of the industry from a fragmented structure to a
concentrated oligopoly has drawn most attention. The number of mass-producing
brewers has declined from 350 in 1950 to 24 in 2000 with a corresponding increase
in the Her￿ndahl index from 204 to 3612 (Tremblay and Tremblay: 187), making
this industry one of the most concentrated in U.S. manufacturing.5 In 2003, nearly
80% of beer consumption in the U.S. was served by the ￿big three￿ : Anheuser-Busch
(49.8%), SABMiller (17.8%) (formerly Miller and owned by Philip Morris) and Coors
(10.7%).
Anheuser-Busch has been the largest beer producer after 1955, with an ever in-
creasing market share (Table 1). Budweiser and Bud Light, Anheuser-Busch￿ s two
leading brands, currently capture approximately one third of beer sales nationwide.6
Overall, Anheuser-Busch has consolidated as the leader in this industry through con-
stant expansion and active advertising strategies (Elzinga, Tremblay and Tremblay).
While imports and specialty beers have increased their combined market share from
less than 1% in the 1970￿ s to approximately 12% and 3%, respectively, their impact
in the industry as a whole remains limited. The reason is that imports and specialty
beers tend to compete less directly with traditional mass-producers since they target
di⁄erent types of consumers.
4A commonly used classi￿cation for beers sorts them into lagers and ales. Lagers are brewed
with yeasts that ferment at the bottom of the fermenting tank. Ales, on the other hand, are brewed
with yeasts fermenting at high temperatures and at the top of the fermenting tank. Porter and
stout are malt beverages as well, although darker and sweeter than ale, with minimal market share
in the United States.
5The Her￿ndahl indices for cigarettes, breakfast cereals and automobiles are 3100, 2446 and 2506
respectively; for all manufacturing industries the index is 91 (U.S. Census Bureau, 1997 concentration
ratios).
6Based on 2001 production estimates (Tremblay and Tremblay: 13)
4Table 1: Market Shares,Two and Four-Firm Concentration Ratios in the Beer Indus-
try, Selected Years, 1950-2003
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1996 2003
A-B 5.8 6.5 9.6 11.6 17.8 23.4 28.4 38.1 43.4 45.4 49.8
Miller 2.5 2.6 2.7 3.6 4.1 8.5 21.1 20.8 21.8 21.8 17.8
Coors 0.8 1.2 2.2 3.5 5.8 7.9 7.8 8.3 9.7 10.0 10.7
Stroh/Schlitz 6.7 9.2 8.8 10.8 14.8 18.9 11.9 12.9 8.1 8.3 4.27
C2 11.9 13.3 16.0 20.1 29.9 38.8 49.5 58.9 65.2 67.2 67.6
C4 22.0 22.1 27.0 34.4 44.2 57.7 66.4 80.8 83.0 85.5 83.0
Source: Greer (1998), Beer Marketer￿ s Insights, Anheuser-Busch￿ s 2004 Annual Report
The U.S. brewing industry is characterized by numerous product introductions
and, consequently, a large number of brands. However, beers from mass-producing
brewers do not di⁄er substantially in taste or quality. Instead, consumers ￿subjec-
tively￿di⁄erentiate brands by relying on cues such as price premiums and advertising
(Tremblay and Tremblay, ch. 7). An interesting fact about brand di⁄erentiation is
the increasing popularity of light beer. Since the successful introduction of Miller Lite
in the 1970￿ s, light beers have become the most popular beer type and now account
for almost half the sales of beer in the U.S.
Advertising has played a central role in the industry. Currently, the advertising-
to-sales ratio for beer is 8.7 percent compared to 2.9 percent for cigarettes, and 7.1
percent for other beverages.8 National brewers have taken advantage of the more
cost-e⁄ective marketing channel: national TV. Regional producers and other small
brewers have lost market share to the rising national producers, or have dissapeared
altogether, partly because of this marketing disadvantage but also because of tech-
nological changes that required larger brewing plants to achieve a minimum e¢ cient
scale (MES). In addition to the features brie￿ y presented here, the potential negative
externalities of alcohol consumption expand the scope of this industry to additional
policy and social arenas.
The Federal Excise Tax Increase
In 1990, U.S. Congress approved an increase in the federal excise tax on beer
from $9 to $18 per barrel. All brewers and importers were required to pay this tax
on all produced units as of January of 1991. This increase, which was equivalent to
an additional 65.3 cents in federal taxes per 24-pack (288 ounces), represented the
largest federal tax hike for beer in U.S. history.
Figure 1 shows mean quarterly prices (over all cities) for three beer segments from
the dataset utilized in this paper. There is a clear shift in the mean price of all three
7Stroh exited the market in 1999. This number corresponds to Pabst￿ s market share (the acquirer
of some of Stroh￿ s brands).
8Source: Advertising Age, 2000, cited in Tremblay and Tremblay.






































































































































Import Budget Super- premium
Source: IRI Database, University of Connecticut
categories. While the mean price increase in imports is larger than the other two
series, all mean increases are higher than the actual tax hike of 65.3 cents per 288
ounces: $2.2 for imports, $1.4 for super-premium beers and $1.2 for budget beers.
These increases were, on average, 237%, 114%, and 84%, respectively, larger than the
tax increase of 65.3 cents per case. As shown by Anderson, de Palma and Kreider, in
oligopolies with di⁄erentiated products an excise tax can be passed on to consumers
by more than 100%.
3 The Empirical Model
The approach taken in this paper involves the comparison of di⁄erent models of
￿rm pricing behavior by exploiting the exogenous variation of an increase in the
federal excise tax. Since all models depend on demand parameters, the ￿rst step is to
estimate brand-level demand. With these estimates, marginal costs of each brand are
recovered for all models in each quarter that preceded the tax increase. Using each
brand￿ s median marginal cost (over the pre-tax period), the demand estimates and the
pre-tax values of the remaining variables, a search for the prices that would prevail
under each model after the excise tax increase is conducted. The price increases
resulting from this exercise are then compared to direct estimates of the actual price
increases. This section describes the demand and supply models utilized as well as
some details on recovering marginal costs.
63.1 Demand
The functional form is based on the representative consumer approach of neoclassical
demand models. In this paper, a linear approximation to the Almost Ideal Demand
System (LALIDS) developed by Deaton and Muellbauer is used because of its desir-
able aggregation properties. Using a LALIDS model also allows a speci￿cation that
is linear in the parameters to be estimated.
Formally, let ￿ = f1;:::;Jg be the product set, t = f1;:::;Tg the set of markets
(in this study a market is de￿ned as a city-quarter pair), qt = (q1t;:::;qJt) the vector
of quantities demanded, pt = (p1t;:::;pJt) the corresponding price vector and x￿
t = P











t is brand j￿ s sales share and logPt is a price index approximated







j is brand j￿ s ￿ base￿share, de￿ned as wo
j ￿ T ￿1 P
t wjt. An advantage of
this price index is that it does not contain wjt directly, but rather a ￿ ￿xed￿base, wo
j,
thereby moderating the problem of having an additional endogenous variable on the
right hand side of (1).
Following Sutton (45-46) advertising is assumed to be persuasive rather than
informative. The focus is on traditional advertising (e.g. television, radio and press),
rather than on local promotional activity (e.g. local paper, in-store promotions, and
end-of-aisle product location), as the key advertising variable because it has played
a crucial role in the development and research of the industry. Also, traditional
advertising is more apt to be independent of the pricing strategy, since, in general,
mass media advertising by brewers seldom informs consumers about price. Further,
only the ￿ ow e⁄ects of advertising are considered with all lagged own- and cross-
advertising terms being omitted for the demand equation.10
Advertising is incorporated into equation (1) through the intercept term a￿
jt, which
is modi￿ed to equal:
a
￿





where Ak represents advertising expenditures of brand k. The parameter ￿ is
included to account for decreasing returns to advertising. Following Gasmi, La⁄ont
and Voung, ￿ is set equal to 0.5. Substituting equation (3) into equation (1) gives:
9Moschini explains how this price index can have superior approximating properties than the
Stone price index of Deaton and Muellbauer.
10The existence of possible stock e⁄ects was investigated but the estimated coe¢ cients on lagged
advertising expenditures were found not to be statistically di⁄erent than zero.






k bjk logpkt + dj log(x
￿
t=Pt) + ejt (4)
Equation (4) can now be interpreted as a ￿rst-order approximation in prices and
advertising to the demand function that allows for unrestricted price and advertising
parameters. However, estimation becomes problematic given the large number of
coe¢ cients.
To solve this dimensionality problem, the Distance Metric (DM) method of Pinkse,
Slade and Brett is employed. This method simpli￿es the computation of cross-
coe¢ cients (bjk and cjk) by specifying them as a function of the distance between
brands j and k in product space. This distance is, in turn, determined by brands￿
observed product characteristics (i.e. their location in product space).
Distance measures may be either continuous or discrete. For example, the alco-
hol content of a brand is an example of a variable that can be used to construct a
continuous distance measure. Dichotomous variables that identify brands by product
segment, such as light beer or premium beer, can be used to construct a discrete dis-
tance measure. The continuous distance measures use an inverse measure of distance,
or closeness, in product space between brands j and k. The discrete distance measures
take the value of 1 if j and k belong to the same grouping and zero otherwise.

















jkg is the set of distance measures used for cross-prices and
￿jk = f￿1
jk;:::;￿S
jkg the set of measures used for cross-advertising, while ￿ and ￿ are
the coe¢ cients to be estimated. Replacing (5) and (6) into (4) and regrouping terms
gives the following empirical model:



























t=Pt) + ejt (8)
Because the distance measures are symmetric by de￿nition, symmetry may be
imposed by setting ￿ and ￿ to be equal across equations. This implies that bjk = bkj
and cjk = ckj. In principle, (J ￿ 1) seemingly unrelated equations can be estimated.
However, if J is very large, as is the case in this paper with 64 brands, then it may
become impractical to estimate such a large system of equations. One method to
reduce the dimensionality of the estimation procedure is to assume that the own-price
8and own-advertising coe¢ cients (bjj and cjj), as well as the price index coe¢ cient (dj),
are constant across equations thereby reducing estimation to a single equation. Since
this is too restrictive of an assumption, following Pinkse and Slade the coe¢ cients
bjj, cjj, and dj are speci￿ed as linear functions of brand j￿ s characteristics.11 The
estimated coe¢ cients in (7), ￿l and ￿m, together with the distance measures between
brands (￿jk and ￿jk) are then used to recover cross-terms (bjk and cjk) and cross-
elasticities.12
3.2 Supply
Formally, let ￿ = f1;:::;Ng denote the set of ￿rms and Fn the set of brands produced
by ￿rm n 2 ￿. Assuming constant marginal costs and linear additivity of advertising,








where cj denotes brand j￿ s marginal cost, pj its price and Aj ￿rm n￿ s advertising























￿ 1 = 0, with respect to Aj (11)
While derivatives are obtained directly from demand estimates, the term with a
horizontal brace in (10) takes di⁄erent values depending on the model of interest. In
principle, di⁄erent games in advertising may also be modeled by setting
@qk
@Aj to an
expression similar to the one in brackets in equation (10). However, given the small
magnitude of advertising coe¢ cients obtained from demand estimation, advertising
games (collusion, Bertrand-Nash and Stackelberg) produced equilibrium conditions
that were essentially indistinguishable from each other. As a consequence, price is
treated as the main strategic variable of interest while it is assumed that ￿rms compete
in a Bertrand-Nash fashion in advertising.
For Bertrand-Nash competition in prices, the term
dpm
dpj in (10) takes a value of zero,
leaving only the partial derivative term
@qk
@pj multiplying price-cost margin (pk ￿ ck).
Stackelberg Leadership
11Specifying a coe¢ cient as a linear function of product or market characteristics amounts to
interacting the variable to which the coe¢ cient corresponds with these characteristics.
12See Rojas and Peterson for further details on demand estimation.
9For the Stackelberg leadership game, the term
dpm
dpj takes a value of zero if j is a
follower brand. If j is a leading brand the term
dpm
dpj is computed from the ￿rst order
conditions of followers by applying the implicit function theorem.13 More speci￿cally,
de￿ne a partition of the product set as ￿ = (￿f;￿l), where ￿f is the set of follower
brands and ￿l is the set of leading brands. The ￿rst order condition of all follower
brands with respect to price (10) is totally di⁄erentiated with respect to all followers￿








































dpl = 0; j;k;f 2 ￿f
h(j;l) (12)
where ￿￿
jk takes the value of one if brands j and k are produced by the same ￿rm
and zero otherwise. For a given pl, there are JF (where JF is the number of followers)
expressions like (12). Let G be the (JF ￿ JF) matrix that contains all g elements





























For a given pl, and using the above de￿nitions, (12) can be written in matrix
notation as:
GDs ￿ Hldpl = 0
where dpl is treated as a scalar (for matrix operations). The JF derivatives of the
followers￿prices with respect to a given pl can then be computed as:
13Villas-Boas uses a similar strategy and notation in her study of models of vertical competition.
14It is assumed that the advertising (11) does not play a role in deriving
dpm
dpj . Without this
assumption, inversion of matrix G below is not possible since it is not a square matrix. Results are





Concatenating the (J ￿ JF) vectors of dimension (JF ￿ 1) given in (13) (i.e.
one vector for each pl) gives D = G￿1H. The (JF)￿(J ￿ JF) matrix D has all the
derivatives of the followers￿prices with respect to all of the leaders￿prices. Speci￿cally,
D has typical element
dpf
dpl , for f 2 ￿f and l 2 ￿l.
Collusive Price Leadership
Based on accounts reported in the industry, it may be assumed that followers
exactly match Budweiser￿ s price changes. In this case, called ￿collusive price leader-
ship￿(see Scherer and Ross: 248), only the ￿rst order conditions of the ￿rm producing
the leading brand (i.e. Anheuser-Busch) are relevant, since followers do not price via
pro￿t-maximization but rather by imitating the leader. The term
dpm
dpl in (10) is set
to 1 in Budweiser￿ s ￿rst order condition and to zero for Anheuser-Busch￿ s remaining
￿rst order conditions.
3.3 Price-Cost Margins and Marginal Costs
Adding up (10) and (11) in a given market obtains:



















In vector notation, (14) can be expressed as:
Q
o ￿ ￿(p ￿ c) = 0; (15)
Qo and (p￿c) are J ￿1 vectors with elements (qj(p;A)￿1) and (pj ￿cj), respec-
















jk takes a value of 1 if brands j and k are produced by same ￿rm and zero
otherwise. Applying simple inversion to ￿ in (15) gives the implied marginal costs:
c = p ￿ ￿
￿1Q
o (16)
Using the demand estimates, (16) is computed in all markets. For the Bertrand-
Nash model, this is done in a straightforward fashion. For Stackelberg, collusion, and
collusive price leadership models some details and considerations are presented next.
Stackelberg Model
Operationally, marginal costs are also obtained by applying (16). However, the
derivative
dpm
dpj is computed via (13). Several technical di¢ culties arise in this model.
11First, there is an immense number of possible Stackelberg scenarios. Given the mo-
tivation in this paper, only the case in which Anheuser-Busch acts as a leader, both
with all its brands as well as with Budweiser only, are considered.
Second, since the term
dpm
dpj in the leaders￿￿rst order conditions is a function of
followers￿marginal costs (see equation (13)), these need to be computed ￿rst. When
Anheuser-Busch acts as a leader with all its brands, followers￿marginal costs can be
obtained by inversion of a smaller system of dimension JF in (16). These marginal
costs are used to compute
dpm
dpj and then to estimate the marginal costs of the leading
brands. When Budweiser is a sole brand leader, it is assumed that it only leads
brands produced by rival ￿rms (i.e. not by Anheuser-Busch) to reduce computation
to a manageable level. Hence, except for Budweiser, the term
dpm
dpj is set to zero if m
is produced by Anheuser-Busch.
Collusive Price Leadership Model
In this case, only Anheuser-Busch￿ s marginal costs can be derived since ￿rst order
conditions of other ￿rms are not relevant (see section 3.2). These marginal costs are
also recovered by applying (16) to a system of dimension JL (where JL is the number
of brands produced by Anheuser-Busch) and by setting
dpm
dpj to 1 in Budweiser￿ s ￿rst
order condition and zero in the remaining ￿rst order conditions.
Collusive Model
Any collusive possibilities (e.g. between speci￿c products or ￿rms) can be inves-
tigated by appropriately modifying the ownership elements ￿￿
jk. For example, full
collusion, or joint pro￿t maximization, can be represented by setting ￿￿
jk = 1 for all
j;k in the product set.
4 Data
Table (2) provides a description and summary statistics for all variables used in
this study. The main data source is the Information Resources Inc. (IRI) Infoscan
Database.15 The IRI data includes prices and total sales for several hundred brands
for up to 58 cities over 20 quarters (1988-1992). Volume sales (Quantity) in each city
are reported as the number of 288-ounce units sold each quarter by all supermarkets
in that city and price is an average price for a volume of 288 oz. for each brand. To
maintain focus on brands with signi￿cant market share, all brands with a local market
share of less than 3% are excluded from the sample. Using this selection criterion,
64 di⁄erent brands produced by 13 di⁄erent brewers are included in the sample. On
average there are 37 brands sold in each city market with a minimum of 24 brands
and a maximum of 48 brands. Appendix A contains a table of all the brands chosen
as well as other details of the database and the data selection procedure.
15IRI and LNA data was kindly provided by Ronald Cotterill, Director of the Food Marketing
Policy Center at the University of Connecticut.
12In addition to price and sales data, the IRI database contains information on
several additional brand speci￿c and market variables. Because beer is sold in a
variety of sizes (e.g., six and twelve packs), the variable UNITS provides the number
of units, regardless of size, sold each quarter. These data are used to create an
average size distance measure de￿ned as SIZE =Quantity=UNITS. The variable
COV (Coverage) measures fraction of market coverage for each brand and is de￿ned
as the sum of all commodity value (ACV) sold by stores carrying the product divided
by the ACV of all stores in the city. Beers with low coverage may be interpreted as
specialty brands that are targeted to a limited fraction of the population. Lastly, the
variable OV ER50K, which is the fraction of households that have an income above
$50,000 in each city-quarter pair, was also included in the estimation.
Advertising data (A) was obtained from the Leading National Advertising annual
publication. These are quarterly data by brand comprising total national advertising
expenditures for 10 media types. Alcohol content (ALC) was collected from various
specialized sources. With no clear consensus on brand product classi￿cations, ￿ve
di⁄erent classi￿cations are considered to construct discrete distance measures. These
classi￿cations are (a) budget, light, premium, super-premium, and imports, (b) light
and regular, (c) budget, light, and premium, (d) domestic and import, and (e) budget,
premium, super-premium, and imports (Greer).
Because not all brands are sold in all city markets, a binary variable (R) takes a
value of one if brand j is a regional brand and zero if it is a national brand. This
variable is used to construct a distance measure to test whether brands that national
(regional) compete more strongly with each other (see next section).
Data for demand side instruments were collected from several additional sources.
A proxy for supermarkets labor cost (WAGES) is constructed from data from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics CPS monthly earning ￿les. City density estimates (DEN),
collected from Demographia and the Bureau of Labor Statistics, were included to
proxy for cost of shelf space. For expenditures, median income (INCOME) from




The characteristics utilized are alcohol content (ALC), product coverage (COV ),
and container size (SIZE). The one-dimensional measures ALC￿, COV ￿ and SIZE￿
between brands j and k are de￿ned as 1=(1+2jzj ￿ zkj), where z is the characteristic
used. The two-dimensional space measures are computed with a similar expression
with the denominator equal to (1 + 2 ￿ Euclidean Distance) and are denoted AC,
AS, and CS. A, C, and S depict the characteristic used (alcohol, coverage and size)
13Table 2: Data Description and Summary Statistics
Variable Description Units Mean St D Min Max
Price Average Price per brand $/288oz 12.1 3.9 0.82 28.96
Quantity Volume Sold 288 oz. 23.5 63.6 0.001 2652
SIZE Quantity/Units N/A 0.38 0.117 0.08 1.30
Units=# of units sold, all sizes
Coverage Sum of all commodity value (ACV) % 74 28.61 0.26 100
(COV) sold by stores with the product /
ACV of all stores in the city
OVER50K % households with income>$50k/year % 23.3 6.1 10.3 44.8
A National advertising expenditures Mill $ 3.54 6.3 0 40.28
per quarter
ALC Alcohol Content %/vol 4.48 0.94 0.4 5.25
R 1 if brand is regional, 0 otherwise 0/1 0.15 - - -
WAGES Average worker wage in retail sector $/hour 7.3 1.17 3.58 12.3
DEN Population per square mile (000) 4.73 4.13 0.73 23.7
INCOME Median Income (000) $ 31.99 6.9 18.1 53.4
in the two-dimensional space in which the Euclidean distance is calculated.16 Note
that two products at the same location in product space have a closeness measure of
one.
Discrete Distance Measures
Three di⁄erent types of discrete distance measures are utilized. The ￿rst type
focuses on di⁄erent product groupings including product segment, brewer identity,
and national brand identity. The ￿ve di⁄erent product segment classi￿cations de￿ned
in the previous section are considered. Each measure is denoted PROD1 through
PROD5 and is equal to one if brands j and k belong to the same product segment
and zero otherwise. A discrete distance measure, BREW, is equal to one if brands
j and k are produced by the same brewer and zero otherwise. Utilizing this distance
measure will allow the model to determine if consumers are more apt to substitute
between brands of the same ￿rm when there are price changes, and if there are rival,
or spillover, e⁄ects in advertising among beers produced by the same brewer. The
distance measure REG distinguishes between regional and national brewers and it
takes a value of one if either brands j and k are regional (Rj = Rk = 1) or national
(Rj = Rk = 0). This distance measure is used to test whether brands that are
16Because the continuous product characteristics alcohol content (ALC), product coverage
(COV ), and container size (SIZE) have di⁄erent units of measurement, their values are rescaled
before computing the distance measures. To restrict the product space for each of these character-
istics to values between 0 and 1, each continuous product characteristic is divided by its maximum
value. This facilitated the de￿nition of common boundaries (see below) for brands located in the
periphery of the product space.
14national (regional) compete more strongly with each other.17
Following Pinkse and Slade, two other types of discrete measures are constructed
based on the nearest neighbor concept and if products share a common boundary in
product space. Brands j and k share a common boundary if there is a set of consumers
that would be indi⁄erent between either brand and prefers these two brands over any
other brand in product space. A common boundary measure is equal to one if brands
j and k share a common boundary and zero otherwise while a nearest neighbor
measure is equal to one if brands j and k are nearest neighbors (mutual or not) and
zero otherwise. The nearest neighbor (NN) and common boundary (CB) measures
are computed for all brands based on their location in alcohol content-coverage space
(NNAC and CBAC) and coverage-container size space (NNCS and CBCS).
Each of the nearest neighbor and common boundary measures has an exogenous
version and an endogenous version. For the computation of exogenous measures the
criterion used is the Euclidean distance. Endogenous measures are constructed in
a similar fashion, except that product k￿ s distance from j is equal to the square of
the Euclidean distance between them plus k￿ s price (i.e. k￿ s ￿ delivered price￿at j￿ s
location).18 Including price in the nearest neighbor and common boundary measures
allows consumers￿brand choices to be in￿ uenced by both the distance in character-
istics and in price (an endogenous variable).
To measure how crowded is the product space around a speci￿c brand, the number
of common boundaries shared by a brand in (#CB) is computed. This variable is
included in the constant and also interacted with own-price and own-advertising.
5.2 Demand and Instruments
Given the strategic nature of price and advertising, all terms containing these two
variables may be correlated with the error term and are hence treated as endogenous.
To avoid simultaneity bias, an instrumental variables approach is used to consistently
estimate ￿.
Let nz be the number of instruments, Z the (T ￿J)￿nz matrix of instruments, S
the collection of right hand side variables in equation (7), ￿ the vector of parameters to
be estimated and w sales shares in vector form. The generalized method of moments
(GMM) estimator ^ ￿GMM = (S0PzS)￿1S0Pzw is employed. The consistent estimator
for its asymptotic variance is de￿ned as Avar(^ ￿GMM) = (S0PzS)￿1, where Pz =
Z(Z0^ ￿Z0)￿1Z and ^ ￿ is a diagonal matrix with diagonal element equal to the squared
residual obtained from a ￿ ￿rst step￿2SLS regression.
Endogeneity issues follow the approach suggested by Nevo (2001). The identi￿-
17These discrete measures are normalized so that weighted prices and advertising expenditures of
rival brands that are in the same grouping are equal to their average.
18The square of the Euclidean distance is employed because a common boundary is de￿ned by
a non-linear equation when price is added to Euclidean distance, thereby increasing computational
time and complexity.
15cation assumption is that, after controlling for brand, city and time speci￿c e⁄ects,
demand shocks are independent across cities. Because beer is produced in large-scale
plants and then distributed to various states, the prices of a brand across di⁄erent
markets share a common marginal cost component, implying that prices of a given
brand are correlated across markets. If the identifying assumption is true, prices will
not be correlated with demand shocks in other markets and can hence be used as
instruments for other markets. In particular, the average price of a brand in other
cities is used as its instrument.19
The data employed in this study are based on broadly de￿ned city-regional mar-
kets. These broad market de￿nitions, which are similar to those used by the Bureau
of Labor Statistics, reduce the possibility of potential correlation between the unob-
served shocks across markets. Furthermore, demand shocks that may be correlated
across markets because of broad advertising strategies are controlled for by including
national advertising expenditures in the demand equation. In general, any unob-
served regional or national shock, like an interest rate shock will a⁄ect demand in
various markets and will violate the independence assumption. To further control for
such unobserved national shocks, time dummies are included in the speci￿cation.
Although a similar instrument could be constructed for advertising, brand-level
advertising expenditures are only observed at the national level in each quarter and
are thus invariant across markets. Alternatively, lagged advertising expenditures are
used as instruments for advertising. This can be done if the identifying assumption
is extended to independence of demand shocks over time, in addition to across cities,
and there is correlation of advertising expenditures over time. Since expenditures,
(x￿
t), are constructed with price and quantity variables, this term is also treated as an
endogenous variable and is intsrumented with median income. A ￿nal identi￿cation
assumption, which is common practice in the literature, is that product characteristics
are assumed to be mean independent of the error term.
Whereas the identifying assumption of independence of demand shocks across
markets may be problematic and di¢ cult to assess, it has been widely used in the
literature.20 Despite its wide acceptance, however, the validity of the proposed in-
struments is assessed by conducting a formal test. Following Nevo (2001), additional
instruments for price are created from city-speci￿c marginal costs (i.e. proxies for
shelf space and transportation costs) and instrument validity is checked with an
overidentifying restrictions test.
As observed by Berry, an additional source of endogeneity may be present in
di⁄erentiated products industries. Unobserved product characteristics, which can be
interpreted as product quality, style, durability, status, or brand valuation, may be
19Alternatively, as in Nevo (2001), the average of regional prices can be used. However, in this
application some brands appear in 1 or 2 cities, making this approach unfeasible.
20Hausman, Leonard and Zona, Slade (1995), Hausman, Nevo (2000b, 2001), Pinkse and Slade,
and Slade (2004) use this assumption. Nevo assumes independence of the demand shock over markets
and over time, as it is done here.
16correlated with the error term and can lead to a bias in the estimated price coe¢ cient.
Following Nevo (2001), this source of endogeneity is controlled for by exploiting the
panel structure of the data with the inclusion of brand-speci￿c ￿xed e⁄ects. These
￿xed e⁄ects control for the unobserved product characteristics that are invariant
across markets, reducing the bias and improving the ￿t of the model. While brand
￿xed e⁄ects do not control for the unobserved product characteristics that are market
(city) speci￿c, the instruments discussed at the beginning of this section are intended
to address this issue.
One ￿nal detail on demand estimation is that the inclusion of brand ￿xed e⁄ects
captures market-invariant product characteristics and hence their coe¢ cients can not
be identi￿ed directly. These coe¢ cients are recovered using a minimum distance
procedure, as suggested by Nevo (2000a). The estimated coe¢ cients on the brand
dummies from the demand equation (in which the invariant characteristics and the
constant are omitted) are used as the dependent variable in a GLS regression, while
the invariant product characteristics and a constant are used as the explanatory
variables.
5.3 Predicted Prices by Models with Higher Excise Taxes
Marginal costs (16) are used to compute each model￿ s predicted equilibrium prices
after the tax change. Since excise taxes were increased for all beers at a uniform
rate of E per unit, predicted prices in quarter y +1 can be computed in each city by
solving for p
y+1
























= 0; for j = 1;::;J
where the superscript y denotes the quarter prior to the tax increase (fourth
quarter of 1990).21 Both qj and the derivatives in brackets are also functions of price
(p
y+1
j ) so the non-linear search includes these terms as well. Other variables (i.e.
advertising, distance measures, product characteristics and total expenditures x￿
t)
are held constant at time y values and parameters are those obtained from demand
estimation.22 In some cities, a few brands (1 or 2) exited or entered the market
between the fourth quarter of 1990 and the ￿rst quarter of 1991. In these cities, the
search was performed with the subset of brands that were present in both quarters.
While this simpli￿cation may be problematic since price movements due to changes
21To avoid sensitivity to potential outliers in quarter y, the median city-speci￿c marginal cost of
brand k over the period 1988-1990 is used for c
y
k.
22Because advertising expenditures play a small role in demand and do not change signi￿cantly
after the tax increase, results are invariable to whether pre- or post-increase advertising is used in
the simulation.
17in the product set are ignored, the potential bias is likely to be small as these are
marginal brands in terms of sales.
The predicted prices are computed in every city and for each brand. This system
is solved by using the iterative Newton algorithm for large-scale problems provided by
Matlab. While convergence is quickly achieved for the Bertrand-Nash and collusive
models, it takes several hours for a computer to solve the system in all cities for the
leadership cases.
5.4 Estimates of Actual Price Increases
Following Hausman and Leonard, for each brand a separate regression of the following
form carried out:
pyz = ￿y + ￿
0I + ￿yz
where pyz is price in quarter y and city z (i.e. each city-quarter pair y;z corre-
sponds to a market t), ￿z are city ￿xed e⁄ects, I is a vector quarter dummy variables
and ￿ its corresponding vector of coe¢ cients. The coe¢ cient on the dummy for the
￿rst quarter of 1991 is interpreted as the absolute mean price increase for that brand
due to the tax increase. One caveat with this interpretation is that this coe¢ cient
captures the mean e⁄ect on price of all city-invariant factors in the ￿rst quarter of
1991 (i.e. other national shocks besides the tax increase). Two factors that could
have also shifted prices were inspected, namely input price changes and seasonality
e⁄ects, but these were found to be statistically insigni￿cant in this quarter.
6 Results
6.1 Demand
Estimation is based on equation (7) and details presented in section 5.2. Demand
estimates presented below were obtained using data for the whole sample period 1988-
1992. Because the functional form of demand constitutes only a local approximation
to any unknown demand function, demand parameters can potentially di⁄er between
the two regimes (pre- and post-tax increase). However, aside from slightly larger
standard errors, demand estimates with pre-increase data produced results that were
essentially the same as those obtained with the full sample. Demand estimates,
therefore, are robust to these two sample sizes.
The regressions below contain variables that consistently had the greatest ex-
planatory power in di⁄erent speci￿cations. Table (3) presents the estimation results
of two models. The di⁄erence between models 1 and 2 is the inclusion of brand ￿xed
e⁄ects. City and time binary variables are included in both models (coe¢ cients not
reported). Coe¢ cients are presented in six groups, one for each term in equation (7).
18The ￿rst group contains the estimated coe¢ cients of variables in the constant
ajt. Because alcohol content, brewer dummies and product segment variables for
each brand are constant across time and cities, their coe¢ cients can not be directly
identi￿ed when brand dummies are included in model 2. A minimum distance (MD)
procedure is utilized to recover these coe¢ cients (see section 5.2). A second-stage
regression is performed with the estimated coe¢ cients on brand dummies as the de-
pendent variable and alcohol content (ALC), product segments (budget, light, pre-
mium, super-premium and import), brewer dummies, and a constant as explanatory
variables. While the market-invariant product characteristics in the MD procedure
explained only 12% of the variation in the coe¢ cients of the brand dummies, all co-
e¢ cients recovered from the MD procedure except for the constant are signi￿cantly
di⁄erent from zero at the 1% signi￿cance level. The positive coe¢ cients on the prod-
uct segment binary variables indicate that these product segments have larger budget
shares than the light (or base) product segment. An increase in alcohol content is
associated with a reduction in the budget share.
The only product-speci￿c variable that does vary by market is the number of com-
mon boundaries in alcohol content-product coverage space (#CBAC). The negative
coe¢ cient on #CBAC shows that brands that share a common boundary with more
neighbors in alcohol-coverage space have lower sales (budget) share than those with
fewer common boundaries. Thus, the higher number of close neighbors, the greater
the competition between brands. Conversely, the demographic variable OV ER50K
has a negative sign which implies that sales shares tend to be smaller in cities where
the fraction of high income families is larger. This ￿nding is consistent with the fact
that more that half of beer is consumed by households with an annual income of
$45,000 or less (Beer Institute).
The estimated coe¢ cients for own-price, own-advertising, and their interactions
with product characteristics are reported in the next two groups in table 3. Be-
cause price and advertising are highly correlated with their corresponding interactions
with product coverage, the inverse of this latter variable (1=COV ) is used to avoid
collinearity.
The own-price and own-advertising coe¢ cients are signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero
at the 1% level and have the expected negative and positive signs. The negative
coe¢ cients on the interaction of price and advertising with the inverse of product
coverage indicates that as the coverage of a brand increases, the own-price e⁄ect for
that brand decreases (becomes less negative) while the own-advertising e⁄ect increases
(becomes more positive). Thus, the sales of brands that are widely sold within a city
are less sensitive to a change in price than are brands that are less widely available.
Also, advertising is more e⁄ective for brands that are more widely sold. Finally, as
the number of common boundaries increases the own-price e⁄ect increases (becomes
more negative) and the own-advertising e⁄ect decreases. This shows that higher
brand competition is associated with more price responsive demand and less e⁄ective
advertising.
19Table 3: Demand Estimation Results with Instrumental Variables (GMM)
Dependent Variable: Sales Share (wjt), equation (7)
Variable￿ Coe¢ cient Variable￿ Coe¢ cient
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Brand Dummies X ￿ X ￿









































































































Overidenti￿cation J-Statistic (p-value): Model 1: (0.90); Model 2: (0.50)
R2 from MD regression: 0.12
Based on 33,392 observations. Coe¢ cients in table are original coe¢ cients x 104. All speci￿cations
include time, city and brand dummies (not reported). Asymptotic t-statistics in parenthesis.
xEstimates for minimum distance (MD) procedure; it also includes brewer dummies (not shown)
￿Description of variables and distance measures, [￿
l] and [￿m], is presented in table 4 below
20Table 4: Description of Variables and Distance Measures used in Demand Estimation
#CBAC # of Common boundary neighbors in Alcohol-Coverage Space
#CBCS # of Common boundary neighbors in Coverage-Size Space
#CBCSN # of Common boundary neighbors in endogenous Coverage-Size Space
AC 1/[1+2￿(Euclidean distance in Alcohol-Coverage space)]
NNAC 1 if j and k are nearest neighbors (mutual or not) in Alcohol-Coverage
space, 0 otherwise
BREW 1 if j and k produced by same brewer, 0 otherwise
PROD2 1 if j and k in same segment: light or regular
REG 1 if j and k are regional or j and k are national, 0 otherwise
SIZE* 1/(1+2jSIZEj-SIZEkj)
CBCSN 1 if j and k share common boundary in endog. Coverage-Size space, 0 otherwise
NNCSN 1 if j and k nearest neighbors (mutual or not) in Coverage-Size space, 0 otherwise
PROD3 1 if j and k in same segment: budget, light or premium
Comparing models 1 and 2, the estimated own-price coe¢ cient is nearly twice
as large in absolute terms when brand dummies are included. Conversely, the own-
advertising coe¢ cient decreased by approximating 80 percent in model 2 compared to
model 1. The better goodness-of-￿t measures for model 2 and the magnitude of change
on both price and advertising coe¢ cients highlight the importance of accounting for
endogeneity (resulting from unobserved product characteristics) with the inclusion of
brand dummies. Furthermore, the overidenti￿cation test in model 2 (p-value=0.50)
suggests that the choice of instruments is valid. Discussion of results is henceforth
based on model 2.
The next two groups in table 3 contain the weighted cross-price and weighted
cross-advertising terms. For each term, the weighing distance measure is in brackets.
Several speci￿cations were tried to determine the product spaces that were most rele-
vant for weighing cross-prices and cross-advertising. Alcohol-Coverage appeared to be
the most important continuous product space for price and Coverage-Size for adver-
tising. Therefore, nearest neighbor and common boundary measures were computed
in Alcohol-Coverage space for price and in Coverage-Size space for advertising. How-
ever, when using AC to weigh cross-price terms and CS to weigh cross-advertising
terms in the same regression created collinearities. Replacing CS by the distance
measure SIZE￿ reduced the collinearity problem while not a⁄ecting the other para-
meter estimates.
In model 2, the estimated coe¢ cients on the weighted cross-price terms are all
positive. Thus, brands that are closer in the alcohol content-product coverage space
(both in terms of Euclidean distance and nearest neighbor), produced by the same
brewer, have similar geographic coverage, or belong to the same product segment are
stronger substitutes than other brands. Intuitively, consumers will more likely switch
to a brand located nearby in product space and/or produced by the same brewer than
21to more distant brands. Based on the magnitude of the estimated coe¢ cients, the
strongest substitution e⁄ects are for brands in the same product segment and with
similar geographic coverage.
With the exception of product segment, the estimated coe¢ cients on weighted
cross-advertising terms are positive. This suggests that there are spillover e⁄ects in
advertising across brands that are located more closely in the product space and with
the same geographic coverage. However, the negative coe¢ cient for product segment
indicates that there are rival cross-advertising e⁄ects for brands in the same prod-
uct segment, thereby potentially o⁄setting some of the spillover e⁄ects. In general,
positive and negative cross-advertising e⁄ects have the same order of magnitude.
However, as shown in table 6, there are more positive cross-advertising elasticities
than negative cross-advertising elasticities, indicating that spill-over e⁄ects dominate
rival e⁄ects.
The estimated coe¢ cient on real expenditures, log(xt=Pt), is not statistically dif-
ferent from zero. Various speci￿cations were tried that interacted product or market
characteristics with real expenditures, but none of these speci￿cations yields statisti-
cally signi￿cant coe¢ cients. This result implies that the brand-level income elastici-
ties are all equal to one.
Elasticities were computed in each city-quarter pair with coe¢ cients from model
2. The median own-price elasticity across all brands is -3.34 while the median own-
advertising elasticity is 0.024. All own-price elasticities are negative while approx-
imately 85% of own-advertising elasticities are positive. All cross-price elasticities
are positive and have a median value of 0.0593 whereas 88% of cross-advertising
elasticities are positive and have a median of 0.021.23
A sample of median price and advertising elasticities is presented in tables 5 and 6.
To facilitate comparison of the cross-price and cross-advertising patterns, these tables
also contain information on the distance measures used to compute the elasticities.
Table 5 divides brands into light and regular. Brands that are located closer in
product space have, in general, higher cross-elasticities. For example, Budweiser,
Michelob, Coors, Miller Genuine Draft, and Miller High Life are located close to one
another in the product space. The cross-price elasticities between these brands are
generally larger than the cross-price elasticities with Keystone, Old Style, Olympia,
Pabst, and all light beers. Estimated con￿dence intervals (not shown) indicate that
all price elasticities are signi￿cantly di⁄erent than zero at the 5% level.24
As shown in table 6, the median advertising elasticities vary considerably across
brands. While all of the own-advertising elasticities in the table and most of the
cross-advertising elasticities are positive, there are several negative cross-advertising
23In general, median own-price elasticities are similar to those reported in Hausman, Leonard and
Zona (-4.98), and Slade (-4.1). Cross-price elasticities are similar to those in Slade but an order of
magnitude smaller than those reported by Hausman, Leonard and Zona.
24The 95% con￿dence intervals were computed using 5,000 draws from the asymptotic distribution
of the estimated coe¢ cients.
22elasticities. These negative cross-advertising elasticities occur between brands in the
same product segment. This is due to the negative coe¢ cient on the cross-advertising
term that is weighted by the product grouping measure PROD3 (table 3). In these
cases, the rival cross-advertising e⁄ects for brands in the same product segment out-
weigh the positive advertising spillover e⁄ects from closely located brands. Not all
of the advertising elasticity estimates, however, are statistically di⁄erent than zero.
Approximately 85% of negative advertising elasticities and 86% of positive elasticities
are signi￿cant at the 5% level.
6.2 Implied Price-Cost Margins
According to details in section 3.3, implied marginal costs in the pre-increase period
are calculated for each model using the estimated demand parameters. Comparing
these marginal costs across models is informative about di⁄erences in the equilibrium
predictions of the models. Because price-cost margins as a fraction of price ([p￿c]=p)
are more readily interpretable than marginal costs, pre-increase summary statistics of
this measure (in percentage format) are presented in table 7. Six di⁄erent models are
considered: Bertrand-Nash; two Stackelberg scenarios: ￿rm leadership by Anheuser-
Busch and brand leadership by Budweiser; collusive leadership by Budweiser; and
two collusive scenarios: collusion of the three leading ￿rms (Anheuser-Busch, Coors
and Miller) and collusion of three brands, Budweiser, Coors and Miller High Life (the
main regular brands of leading ￿rms).25
25The full collusion case produced unlikely price-cost margins (over 100%). Hence, these two

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































25Table 7: Summary Statistics of Price Cost Margins for Di⁄erent Scenarios, (1988-
1990)*
Mean Median St. Dev
Bertrand-Nash 39.50 36.68 25.96
Anheuser-Busch Stackelberg Leadership 40.08 37.58 26.25
Budweiser Stackelberg Leadership 39.52 36.68 26.00
Collusive Leadership (Budweiser)￿￿ 70.51 60.88 45.09
Collusion 3 ￿rmsx 46.02 46.95 29.14
Collusion 3 brands￿ 40.20 37.17 26.50
￿ Margins are de￿ned as (p ￿ c)=p (in percentage). Presented are the summary statistics
of the 18,369 (brand-city-quarter) observations in the pre-increase period (1988-1990).
￿￿ Price-cost margins obtained for Anheuser-Busch brands only
x Anheuser-Busch, Adolph Coors, Miller (Philip Morris)
￿ Budweiser, Coors, Miller Genuine Draft
The mean price-cost margin of Budweiser as a Stackelberg leader does not to di⁄er
substantially from that of Bertrand-Nash competition. Both Anheuser-Busch as a
Stackelberg leader and collusion among three brands predict similar mean price-cost
margins that are slightly higher than Bertrand-Nash. Collusion among the 3 largest
￿rms predicts the largest mean price-cost margin. When analyzing the medians and
standard deviations, however, values are similar across models, except for the 3-￿rm
collusion and the collusive price leadership scenarios.
Since in the collusive price leadership scenario price-cost margins are only com-
puted for Anheuser-Busch brands, summary statistics for this case are not directly
comparable with those of other models. However, price-cost margins are unreason-
ably large for Budweiser (mean price-cost margin of 164% vs. 82% in Bertrand-Nash,
not shown) and similar to Bertrand-Nash price-cost margins for other brands (mean
price-cost margin 56% vs 54% in Bertrand-Nash, not shown). In all models, price-cost
margins vary considerably across brands. When calculating each model￿ s predicted
prices, this heterogeneity plays an important role.
6.3 Predicted vs. Actual Price Increases
Following details in section 5.3, the estimated demand parameters of model 2 in table
3 together with the implied marginal costs are used to compute the predicted prices
(p
y+1
j ) that would have prevailed under each model after the tax increase. Estimates
of actual mean price increases are, in turn, computed according to details presented





to estimates of actual price increases. The reason for using absolute price increases
rather than a measure relative to the pre-increase price is that the excise tax is based
on quantity sold and hence tax pass-through should be unrelated to the pre-tax price.
26The next ￿gures plot predicted and actual mean price increases for each brand.
For predicted price increases, the mean is calculated using each brand￿ s predicted
price increases over 46 cities. For actual price increases, one regression per brand is
estimated with the price of the brand as the dependent variable and time and city
dummies as regressors. The coe¢ cient on the ￿rst quarter of 1991 time dummy is
interpreted as that brand￿ s mean price increase. Each ￿gure corresponds to one of the
scenarios discussed in the previous section. 95% con￿dence intervals are displayed for
actual mean price increases.26 Table 8 displays summary statistics of the actual and
predicted mean price increases.
Figure 2 corresponds to the Bertrand-Nash model. Except for a handful of brands
(especially Budweiser and Bud Light), Bertrand-Nash behavior tends to underpredict
price increases. This pattern is re￿ ected in a median value of actual mean increases
that is more than 100% greater than the median value of predicted mean price in-
creases ($1.85 vs. $0.88, table 8). Absolute variability is similar between the two
series (standard deviation of 0.93 for actual mean price increases and 0.88 for pre-
dicted mean price increases). However, relative to their mean, predicted mean price
increases are more variable than actual mean price increases.
The predicted mean price increase for Budweiser is the largest ($4.95) and it is
more than twice the value of the actual price increase ($1.91). In general, more
inelastic brands are associated with higher the pass-through rates of a tax increase.
To illustrate, the two largest predicted mean price increases are for Budweiser and
Bud Light, the ￿rst and third most inelastic brands in the sample. Many brands have
tight 95% con￿dence intervals around actual mean increases (around 15c / and 20c /),
indicating that price increases do not vary substantially across cities. This pattern
can particularly be observed for Anheuser-Busch and Coors brands, and, to a lesser
extent, for Pabst, Miller and Stroh brands (brewers that tend to produce nationally).
The Stackelberg scenario in which Anheuser-Busch acts as the price leader with
all its brands (￿gure 3) has a pattern that is similar to the Bertrand-Nash case.
Although it can not be discerned from the ￿gure, in this model predicted increases
are higher than in the Bertrand-Nash case for all but one brand. For Anheuser-
Busch￿ s brands, especially Budweiser, Bud Light and Natural Light, this di⁄erence is
larger and hence discernable from the ￿gures. Table 8 shows that the Anheuser-Busch
Stackelberg model predicts larger mean price increases than Bertrand-Nash.
26The non-linear systems for predicted price increases require 12 hours of computing time. Cal-
culating con￿dence intervals for predicted mean price increases with a bootstrapping technique are


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































33Aside from a larger overprediction for Budweiser (50 cents), the Budweiser Stack-
elberg model depicted in ￿gure 4, on the other hand, yields predicted mean price
increases that are essentially the same to the Bertrand-Nash case (mean and median
are almost equal to Bertrand-Nash, table 8). Overall, the two Stackelberg models
considered do not di⁄er substantially from Bertrand-Nash behavior. The reason for
this is that because reaction functions of followers depend mainly on very small cross-
price coe¢ cients, the term
dpm
dpj in (14) takes small positive values making the ￿rst
order conditions of the leader not substantially di⁄erent from the Bertrand-Nash case
(for which the term
dpm
dpj is equal to zero).
The third leadership model considered is collusive price leadership by Budweiser.
Here, the term
dpm
dpj is set to equal 1 in Budweiser￿ s ￿rst order condition. This scenario
predicts unlikely predicted mean price increases that are on average almost 7 times
larger than actual mean price increases, with some predicted prices in the vicinity of
$15-$16 for some of Anheuser-Busch￿ s brands. As a consequence, this extreme case
can be rejected as a model of price competition.
The 3-￿rm collusion scenario depicted in ￿gure 6 over-predicts the price increases
of the best selling brands of the colluding ￿rms (e.g. Budweiser, Bud Light, Coors
Light, Miller Genuine Draft and Miller Lite) by a large amount. On average, this
scenario predicts higher mean price increases than Bertrand-Nash behavior (table 8).
The 3-brand collusion scenario di⁄ers less strikingly with Bertrand-Nash: it predicts
slightly larger mean price increases than Bertrand-Nash (table 8). This shift is mainly
the consequence of a higher over-prediction for Budweiser and, to a lesser extent, for
the other two colluding brands: Coors and Miller Genuine Draft (￿gure 7).
One metric of the accuracy of di⁄erent models in explaining observed ￿rm be-
havior is the number of brands whose predicted mean price increases fall within the
con￿dence intervals of actual mean price increases. Table 8 presents this number (#
Non-Rejections) for the models considered. According to this metric, the Bertrand-
Nash, 3-brand collusion and Budweiser leadership scenarios explain ￿rm behavior
better than the other models, though equally well among them.
To assess the adequacy of these models, another metric is considered. This metric
weighs mean price increases by each brand￿ s market share. Intuitively, the purpose of
this metric is to penalize a model if it does not do a good job at predicting the mean
price increases of the most important brands; after all, it would more critical to have
greater accuracy for the brands that matter most. The last column in table 8 presents
this weighted mean for the models considered. Under this metric, the Bertrand-Nash
case performs best, though it takes a value of more than two times greater than the
value for actual mean price increases (4.25 vs. 1.82).
The reason for the large di⁄erence in the weighted mean is that the over-prediction
in all models is greater for more popular brands. The combined share of Budweiser
(19%), Bud Light (6%), Coors Light (7%) and Miller Lite (9%) is 41%. In all models,
these are brands for which there is an over-prediction, the largest of which is for
Budweiser. The fact that the weighted mean for actual mean price increases is similar
34Table 8: Summary Statistics of Actual and Predicted Brand Mean Price Increases*
Mean Median St. Dev # Non- Weighted
Rejections￿￿ Mean￿￿￿
Actual Mean Increases 1.69 1.85 0.93 N/A 1.82
Predicted Mean Increases
Bertrand-Nash 1.10 0.88 0.88 10 4.25
A-B Stackelberg LeaderU 1.20 0.94 1.01 9 4.77
Budweiser Stackelberg Leader 1.11 0.89 0.93 10 4.48
Collusive Leadership (Budweiser) 11.70 11.20 1.45 0 21.34
Collusion 3 ￿rmsx 1.79 1.19 1.64 9 7.76
Collusion 3 brands￿ 1.17 0.92 0.99 10 4.84
￿ Actual and predicted mean price increase for each brand are computed over 46 cities.
￿￿ Number of brands for which the predicted mean price increase falls within the con￿dence
intervals of the actual mean price increase
￿￿￿ Weighted average of mean price increases (weight=national market share in fourth quarter 1990)
U A-B = Anheuser-Busch
x Anheuser-Busch, Adolph Coors, Miller (Philip Morris)
￿ Budweiser, Coors, Miller Genuine Draft
to the non-weighted mean (second column in table 8) indicates that there are no
important di⁄erences in actual mean price increases across brands.
7 Conclusion
This paper analyzes pricing behavior in the U.S. brewing industry where there is some
evidence of price leadership by Anheuser-Busch and its Budweiser brand. Bertrand-
Nash, leadership and collusive models are considered as possible candidates of pricing
behavior. To choose the model that is best supported by the data, an exogenous
variation in the data, namely the 100% increase in the federal excise tax, is used to
compare actual price increases with price increases predicted by the di⁄erent models
of pricing behavior.
Using several metrics of closeness between predicted price increases and actual
price increases revealed that, from the models considered, Bertrand-Nash appears to
be more consistent with the actual behavior of ￿rms. However, the data fails to sup-
port the inverse relationship between own-price elasticity and excise tax pass-through
rates predicted by all models. As a consequence, Bertrand-Nash and other models,
tend to overpredict tax pass-through rates of more price-inelastic brands, especially
Budweiser, and to under-predict price increases of more price-elastic brands. Overall,
actual price increases tend to be more similar across brands than any of the models
predict.
35An interpretation of this evidence is that Anheuser-Busch could exert larger mar-
ket power than it actually does even under competitive Bertrand-Nash behavior.
One policy implication of this interpretation is that antitrust concern should be low
in terms of anticompetitive pricing behavior by the leading beer producer. This result
is consistent with the ￿ndings of Nevo (2001) in the ready-to-eat breakfast cereals
who suggests that large price-cost margins can be the result of product di⁄erentia-
tion and the portfolio e⁄ect of ￿rms carrying more than one brand rather than actual
non-competitive behavior.
The models considered here, as most models of pricing behavior, are built upon
the assumption of pro￿t maximization. The results of this paper may be consistent
with simpler, yet plausible pricing strategies. For instance, the fact that actual price
increases for large brewers￿brands (Anheuser Busch, Coors, Miller) as a result of
the tax increase have minimal variation across cities and are similar to actual price
increases of smaller brewers￿brands may be interpreted as leading brewers setting a
common cost mark-up for all brands, regardless of where they are sold (and possibly of
how elastic they are), and smaller brewers matching these mark-ups. This conjecture
is strengthened by the fact that price increases for elastic brands, which are produced
mainly by smaller brewers and are generally more limited in their ability to increase
prices, appear much higher than what Bertrand-Nash and other models suggest, with
values close to actual price increases of the more inelastic brands produced by larger
brewers. While this conjecture is consistent with the informal observations in the
industry, the models considered are not able to capture it. Moreover, there is no
clear way to test it within the pro￿t maximization framework used in this paper.
This issue hence remains as a potential extension.
Scherer and Ross (p. 261-265) explain that a type of ￿rule-of-thumb￿pricing of
the sort suggested above is common in many industries and is used as a way to cope
with ￿uncertainties in the estimation of demand function shapes and elasticities￿
(p. 262). Furthermore, this type of pricing behavior can be used as a coordinating
device, especially when there are changes in costs and ￿rms in the industry share
similar production technologies. To the extent that this type of behavior is facilitating
coordination in the brewing industry, it appears that, as a consequence of the tax
increase, it bene￿ted smaller brewers rather than large ￿rms.
Given the available dataset, the contribution of this paper is to shed some light on
one of the many interesting features of the U.S. brewing industry. Clearly, the avail-
ability of more detailed data would allow to capture aspects that are not addressed
here. For example, dynamic models of price competition can be better assessed with
less aggregated data on the time dimension. Cost data at the manufacturer and re-
tailer level can permit analysis of manufacturer-retailer interaction in the industry
and more rigorous econometric tests of the competing pricing models considered here.
36A Data Description and Selection
IRI is a Chicago based marketing ￿rm that collects scanner data from a large sample
of supermarkets that is drawn from a universe of stores with annual sales of more
than 2 million dollars. This universe accounts for 82% of all grocery sales in the
U.S. In most cities, the sample of supermarkets covers more than 20% of the relevant
population. In addition, IRI data correlates well with private sources in the Brewing
Industry (the correlation coe¢ cient of market shares for the top 10 brands between
data from IRI and data from the Modern Brewery Age Blue Book is 0.95). Brands
that had at least a 3% local market share in any given city were selected. After
selecting brands according to this criterion, remaining observations are dropped if
they had a local market share of less than 0.025%. Brands that appear in less than
10 quarters are also dropped. Also, if a brand appears only in one city in a given
quarter, the observation for that quarter is not included either. This is done because
some variables in other cities are used as instruments.
The original dataset contained observations in 63 cities; ￿ve cities were dropped
because of minimal number of brands or quantities. Overall, the number of cities
increases over time; however, some cities appear only in a few quarters in the middle
of the period. The average number of cities per quarter is 47. The variable R was
constructed as follows. First the percentage of cities in which each brand was present
was averaged over time. A plot of these averages revealed two clusters of brands, one
close to 100% (denoted national brands) and another (roughly) below 50% (denoted
regional brands). The variable WAGES was constructed by averaging the hourly
wages of interviewed individuals from the Bureau of Labor Statistics CPS monthly
earning ￿les at the NBER. For a given city-quarter combination, individuals working
in the retail sector were selected for that city over the corresponding three months.
The average was then calculated over the number of individuals selected.
27These brands correspond to G. Hieleman Brewing Co., which was acquired in 1987 by Australian
Bond Corporation Holdings; it is classi￿ed as a domestic brewer because this foreign ownership was
temporary
37Table 9: Selected Brands and their Brewers [acronym and country of origin] (Brand
ID)
Brewer Brand Brewer Brand
Anheuser-Busch: (1) Budweiser Grupo Modelo (34) Corona
[AB, U.S.] (2) Bud Dry [GM, Mexico]:
(3) Bud Light Goya [GO, U.S.]: (35) Goya
(4) Busch Heineken (36) Heineken
(5) Busch Light [H, Netherlands]:
(6) Michelob Labatt [LB, Canada]: (37) Labatt
(7) Michelob Dry (38) Labatt Blue
(8) Michelob Golden Draft (39) Rolling Rock
(9) Michelob Light Molson [M, Canada]: (40) Molson
(10) Natural Light (41) Molson Golden
(11) Odouls (42) Old Vienna
Adolph Coors (12) Coors Pabst [P, U.S.]: (43) Falsta⁄
[AC, US]: (13) Coors Extra Gold (44) Hamms
(14) Coors Light (45) Hamms Light
(15) Keystone (46) Olympia
(16) Keystone Light (47) Pabst Blue Ribbon
Bond Corp. (17) Black Label (48) Red White & Blue
[B, U.S.]27: (18) Blatz Philip Morris/Miller: (49) Genuine Draft
(19) Heidelberg [PM, U.S.] (50) Meister Brau
(20) Henry Weinhard Ale (51) Meister Brau Light
(21) Henry Weinhard P. R. (52) MGD Light
(22) Kingsbury (53) Miller High Life
(23) Lone Star (54) Miller Lite
(24) Lone Star Light (55) Milwaukee￿ s Best
(25) Old Style Stroh (56) Goebel
(26) Old Style Light [S, U.S.]: (57) Old Milwaukee
(27) Rainier (58) Old Milw. Light
(28) Schmidts (59) Piels
(29) Sterling (60) Schaefer
(30) Weidemann (61) Schlitz
(31) White Stag (62) Stroh
Genesee (32) Genesee FX Matts (63) Matts
[GE, US]: (33) Kochs [W, U.S.]: (64) Utica Club
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